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This paper examines how the experience levels of partner firms impact 
alliance outcomes, specifically the likelihood of alliance extension.  We use the 
organizational learning perspective and transaction costs theories to argue that prior 
alliance experience (gained prior to focal alliance formation), will increase the 
likelihood of extension.  Conversely, using the transaction costs perspective, we argue 
that greater post-formation simultaneous alliance activity will reduce the likelihood of 
alliance extension.  We also test for the interaction effect of these primary 
independent variables.  We used the case-control methodology to select a sample of 
185 alliances formed by 200 firms in the global biopharma industry.  After applying a 
prior correction method to correct for sample selection bias, we conducted a relogit 
regression analysis to test the hypotheses in a multivariate setting. 
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IV. LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Summary of causes for increased transaction costs due to simultaneous 
alliance commitments 
 
Cause: Under conditions of: Constrained by: Impact: 
Increased complexity in 
organizational 


















difficult to value 
Inability to invest 
sufficient resources in 
trust building for 
multiple alliances        




















TABLE 2. Operationalization of Variables 
 
Variable Type: Name: Operationalization: 
Dependent  Alliance Extension  Binary variable. 
Independent Prior Alliance Experience  Average of the number of prior alliances 
formed by each partner before the formation 
of a focal alliance. Continuous variable. 
 Simultaneous Alliance 
Commitments 
 
Count of the average number of alliances 
formed by the two partners between the date 
of formation and the date of extension of the 
focal alliance.  For the half of the sample 
which consisted of the ‘control’ alliances 
that were not extended, we used the 
extension date of the corresponding ‘case’ 
alliance, which was extended, as a 
benchmark. Continuous variable. 
Controls Partner-specific Alliance 
Experience 
Total number of relationships between the 
pair of firms from before formation of the 
focal alliance up until the extension date (in 
the case of ‘controls’ the extension date was 
used as the end date). Log-transformed, 
continuous variable.  
 Duration of Alliance 
(Months) 
The duration of an alliance from formation 
date to extension/non-extension date. 
Standardized, continuous variable.  
 Cultural Distance Based on Hofstede’s (1980) indices and 
Kogut and Singh’s (1988) formula. 
Standardized, continuous variable. 
 Purpose/ scope of the 
alliance: Joint R&D 
Binary variable. 1 indicating a joint R&D 
alliance, 0 indicating otherwise. 
 Governance structure: Equity 
versus non-equity alliances 
Binary variable. 1 indicating an equity 
alliance, 0 indicating otherwise. 
 Industry of partner firms: 
SIC similarity 
SIC code comparison score; 4 indicating all 
four digits of the pair of SIC codes were the 
same, 0 indicating the pair of SIC codes 
were completely different.  Categorical 
variable. 
 Number of Employees 
(000s) 
Average of the number of employees in 
each firm. Log-transformed, continuous 
variable. 
 Profitability (Mils) Average of the net income of each firm in 
millions of dollars (US).  Log-transformed, 
continuous variable. 
 Year of Alliance Formation Dummies for three groups of years, 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 4: Results of Relogit Regression Analysis for Alliance Extension 
 
Dependent variable: Alliance Extension Variable 


















Prior Experience x 
Simultaneous 
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No. of Observations 185 
Dependent variable:  Alliance Extension 
Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
***p < 0.010, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10; all tests are two-tailed. 
 
TABLE 5. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics 
 
Statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Trend 
R-Square 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.12 Increasing 
Chi-Square 7.26 (10) 10.54 (11) 12.32 (11) 15.49 (12) 27.45 (13) Increasing 
Log-likelihood -115.03 -113.388   -112.4996 -110.913   -104.93 Increasing 
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FIGURE 2. Matrix Representing Results 
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VI. MAIN BODY OF THESIS 
1. BACKGROUND 
In this paper, we study the impact of alliance experience on alliance outcomes 
- specifically the likelihood of alliance extension.  We examine this topic through two 
lenses, the organizational learning perspective and the transaction costs theory.  
Although there has been extensive research conducted on the role of prior alliance 
experience in achieving favorable outcomes (e.g., Barkema et al., 1997; Doz 1996), to 
our knowledge, the roles of learning gained from past alliance experience prior to 
alliance formation and of transaction costs after alliance formation on the likelihood 
of alliance extension have not been studied before.     
 We believe that our study makes a significant contribution to the extant 
understanding of strategic alliances in two ways.  Firstly, it addresses an under-
researched issue: the extension of alliances as an alliance outcome.  Secondly, it 
advances the current strategic management and international business literatures by 
utilizing an interesting data sampling methodology.  
 Elaborating on the first point, studies on alliances have proliferated with the 
increased interest among researchers in the topic, which is attributable to the 
increased use of alliances as a strategy in the international business arena over the last 
several decades (Wohlsetter, Smith and Malloy, 2005).  There are several aspects of 
alliance strategy that have been researched extensively including: motivations behind 
alliance formation (e.g., Mariti and Smiley, 1983), the choice of governance structure 
(e.g., Gulati, 1995; Pangarkar and Klein, 2001), and partner selection (e.g., 
Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995).  However, there has been relatively less 
research conducted on alliance outcomes.  Although several case studies (Arino and 
de la Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996) have been conducted, there are only a few large sample 
  
11 
studies, which conduct statistical analysis (e.g., Reuer, Zollo and Singh, 2002).  
However, we are not aware of any studies that focus on alliance extension.   
 We define an alliance extension as one of the following two possibilities: an 
extension of the duration of a current alliance partnership agreement or an expansion 
of the current scope of the alliance (e.g., in terms of increased resource commitment 
such as additional capital commitment or broader coverage).  We submit that alliance 
extension is a positive outcome, though it does not cover all the possibilities of a 
successful conclusion.  For example, it does not include the possibility of alliance 
conclusion upon achievement of its objectives, which can also indicate a successful 
alliance.  Similarly, we submit that non-extension of an alliance does not necessarily 
imply the failure of an alliance.  For example, an alliance may not be extended if the 
goals of the collaborative agreement have been achieved and the partner firms wish to 
continue on their own way.  However, due to the peculiar nature of alliances (highly 
flexible organizational forms with two or more partners that might have their own 
agendas), any one measure of alliance outcome is bound to have positive and negative 
aspects. 
 While many prior studies that have examined alliance outcomes from the 
perspective of a single partner (Killing 1983; Lane and Lubatkin 1998; Zollo, Reuer, 
and Singh 2002, Parkhe, 1993c), our approach is to study alliance extensions from a 
dyadic perspective, since the experience levels of both partners will influence the 
outcome of an alliance (Dussauge, Garrette and Mitchell 2000).  Thus, our level of 
analysis is the alliance.  In addition, the results of past studies on alliance experience 
have been inconclusive with Barkema et al.’s (1997) finding that experience impacts 
alliance outcomes positively, and others (e.g., Merchant and Schendel, 2000), finding 
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no impact.  Therefore, the inconclusive nature of past results suggests the need for 
additional research.   
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  We begin by briefly 
summarizing the key arguments from both the organizational learning and transaction 
costs perspectives, and developing the hypotheses to be tested by the study.  We then 
discuss the methodological aspects of the study, followed by the results of data 
analyses.  We conclude the paper by discussing the key results, the implications and 
limitations of the study, and then make suggestions for further research. 
 
2. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT & HYPOTHESES 
a) Why do firms form alliances? 
As Holmqvist (2005) suggests, the study of strategic alliances seeks to 
understand an alternative form of organizing, which is neither a hierarchy nor a 
market.  Several definitions of strategic alliance have been presented in the literature, 
including one that depicts an alliance as a partnership agreement whereby firms 
engage in cooperation for a prolonged period, with clear organizational borders and 
obligations (Larsson et al., 1998).  Zollo, Reuer and Singh (2002) defined strategic 
alliances as “cooperative agreements of any form aimed at the development, 
manufacture, and/or distribution of new products”. 
Firms may respond to their competitive environment by forming strategic 
alliances (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2001).  In order to conduct research and 
development projects, different types of players in the biotechnology industry - 
dedicated biotechnology firms, large pharmaceutical companies and other research 
institutions – form strategic alliances (Baum, Calabrese and Silverman, 2000).  
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The exact form of strategic alliances can vary widely.  For example, as 
Amaldoss et al. (2000) explain, firms may take part in alliances which merge R&D 
resources or which pool resources across business functions, such as creating a joint 
project between the R&D and marketing functions of the partner firms.  Such an 
approach may help the partner firms in the alliance to obtain greater efficiencies of 
scale and take advantage of complementary skills.  The specific alliance form can 
have important implications and impact the learning potential as well as transaction 
costs, thus impacting the likelihood of extension.  For instance, equity and R&D 
alliances are likely to be more ‘sticky’, which might induce firms to prefer extension 
of current alliances over formation of new ones (Dussauge, Garrett and Mitchell, 
2000).   
 
b) Alliance Outcomes 
Like other inter-organizational relationships, several alliance outcomes are 
possible, including the following: i) completion; ii) termination; and iii) extension.  
However, their appropriateness for use as proxies for positive alliance outcomes 
varies.  
i) Alliances may be completed  
Alliance completion may be indicative of a successful outcome, such as the 
achievement of initial objectives.  For example, a patent registration might signal the 
achievement of initiatives set for an alliance between technology firms.   However, as 
Yang, Taylor and Stoltenberg (1999) argue, alliance completion through achievement 
of goals may not be clearly indicative of alliance success because it does not reflect 
the level of alliance stability achieved, which is dependant on trust-building (Killing, 
1983; Kogut, 1988).  Therefore, the causes for alliance success may not always be 
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obvious.  For example, the completion of a fixed-duration alliance, which has run its 
course, may not clearly indicate the achievement of initially set goals (Buchel, 2003).   
However, the benefit of an analysis of completed alliances is that it is easy to 
identify such cases by selecting to examine, for example, only alliances of fixed-
duration contracts, which were reported as being completed within the estimated time 
frame.  Nevertheless, there are issues with the content validity of using alliance 
completion as an operational measure for alliance performance.  Arino and de la Torre 
1998) argue that alliance performance is independent of longevity, which does not 
indicate the level of alliance stability achieved, but may be the reason for alliance 
completion.  Therefore, for the purposes of contribution to the literature, studying 
completed alliances may not offer any significant insights into alliance outcomes, 
since the factors that contribute to alliance completion may not be obvious. 
ii)  Alliances may be terminated 
Alliances may be terminated due to an unproductive relationship or because of the 
environment, and consequently the need for them or their fit in the partners’ overall 
strategy, has changed.  Since alliance termination occurs for a variety of reasons, it is 
difficult to decipher if the termination is a positive or negative alliance outcome.  For 
example, in a study conducted by Saxton (1997), some partner firms considered 
prematurely terminated alliances as successful, since they had met expectations. 
Alliances that are terminated indicate that the partner firms have made a 
decision not to work on the focal alliance project any further.  However, this does not 
mean that the partners would not want to work together on another project in the 
future.  This is because prior affiliation allows firms to assess the capabilities or 
resources and predict the likely behavior of prior partners, with whom they would also 
have built some trust (Saxton, 1997).   
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One reason for alliance termination may be that the alliance is no longer 
relevant due to the evolution of the competitive environment.  For example, in the 
past, it was only possible for foreign companies to gain access to the Chinese market 
through joint ventures, but after wholly-owned subsidiaries of foreign companies 
were allowed to operate, these companies terminated their joint ventures in order to 
become more efficient (Buchel, 2003).  This example also demonstrates how joint 
ventures between direct competitors may end in early dissolution, as opposed to 
alliances between non-competing firms (Park and Russo, 1996; Park and Ungson, 
1997).  Another reason for alliance termination includes the acquisition of one partner 
firm by the other (Kogut, 1991). 
If we consider alliance survival as an operational measure of strategic alliance 
performance, we need to consider the manner in which the alliance is terminated.  
When alliance longevity is an issue, where an alliance is dissolved before the intended 
goals of the alliance have been fulfilled, then we can say that longevity displays 
content validity as a measure of strategic alliance performance (Arino and de la Torre, 
1998).  However, usually alliance performance is independent of its longevity (Yan 
and Zeng, 1999).  On the other hand, if ownership or contractual changes occur, such 
that one partner is acquired by the other, then these ownership changes do not display 
content validity (Arino and de la Torre, 1998). 
Furthermore, Singh and Mitchell (1996) claim “mutual decisions to end a 
relationship are likely to have little or no negative impact on the performance of either 
partner, because it is unlikely that firms have a systematic tendency to mistakenly end 
valuable relationships.”  Thus, an examination of alliance termination may not 
provide us with useful insights into factors leading to successful performance 
outcomes for partner firms.   
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iii) Alliances may be extended  
We argue that alliance extension is a reasonable proxy for positive 
performance outcomes, as it indicates that partner firms, who are working together or 
have achieved the initial objectives of a particular alliance, want to continue their 
collaborative relationship for that particular project.  For instance, partners may 
expand the scope of the agreement (e.g., a broader research agenda for the particular 
project, or more commitment of resources such as capital) based on its initial success 
(Kogut, 1991) - a possibility covered under extension in this study.  For this reason, 
we can consider alliance extension as a positive alliance outcome, where the decision 
to extend is a bilateral one in which each partner seeks further benefits from the 
alliance.  Furthermore, since alliance extension occurs as a result of partner firms re-
evaluating their own objectives and performance for the focal alliance, it indicates not 
only alliance survival, but also organizational effectiveness (Doz, 1988). 
While some studies have operationalized alliance outcome with financial 
measures such as profitability (e.g., Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002; Merchant and 
Schendel, 2000), or operational measures such as longevity, (e.g., Daussage, Garrette 
and Mitchell, 2000; Yan and Zeng, 1999; Parkhe, 1991), others have relied on 
organizational efficiency measures such as the fulfillment of strategic goals (Parkhe 
1993b; Lin and Germain, 1998).  In this study, we employ alliance extension as an 
organizational effectiveness measure, since we consider it to be a positive alliance 
outcome as seen by both the partners.  Furthermore, we argue that alliance extension 
is a sound choice for measuring alliance outcomes since organizational effectiveness 
measures are more comprehensive, encompassing both financial and operational 




c) Alliance Extension as an Alliance Optimization Measure 
Since strategic alliance performance can be evaluated from two levels – the 
alliance and partner levels - much research has concentrated on alliance and partner 
optimization (Olk, 2002).  With regards to alliance optimization, it can be manifested 
in the continuation of the existence of the alliance and/or stability in alliance 
ownership levels.  These situations imply a lack of change in the current alliance 
agreement because of a successful alliance arrangement with which managers are 
satisfied, either through value creation or conflict reduction (Olk, 2002).   
The results of studies on the relationship between alliance optimization 
measures, such as alliance survival, stability and duration, and partner strategic 
interest measures, such as partner’s satisfaction with alliance, partner’s perceptions, 
partner’s evaluation of the costs and benefits of the alliance, have been inconsistent 
(Olk, 2002).  For example, Geringer and Hebert (1991) found that, while termination 
has a positive relationship with subjective measures, such as partner strategic interest 
measures, the other two types of alliance optimization measures, i.e., stability and 
duration, did not have any significant relationship with the subjective measures.  
Therefore, an appropriate research question would investigate what affects the 
structural stability of an alliance.  Since alliance extension implies a willingness to 
continue a current alliance agreement, it is a better measure of alliance optimization 
than alliance termination or completion. When alliances are terminated or completed 
it is difficult to determine if they have actually been terminated ahead of the initial 
scheduled date or completed as a successful outcome.  Another problem with using 
alliance termination as a measure of alliance optimization is that it does not inform us 
of the partners’ reasons for terminating the alliance.  For example, we do not know if 
it was due to only one partner’s decision or that of both.  The literature also supports 
  
18 
the view that termination or instability does not necessarily imply poor alliance 
performance (e.g., Saxton, 1997; Buchel, 2003).  Therefore, the causality of such 
alliance outcomes is difficult to deduce.  On the other hand, when alliances are 
extended, there is an implication of stability in the collaborative relationship.  Hence, 
we examine the phenomenon of alliance extension, which reflects a degree of stability 
in the collaborative relationship.  Figure 1 presents an overview of the general 
research objective of this paper. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
d) Theoretical Perspectives for Examining Alliance Extension 
Several theoretical perspectives have been applied to the study of strategic 
alliances, with each providing different insights.  They include: 
Industrial Organization Economics (IOE) Theory – This perspective suggests that 
the characteristics of the industrial sector to which a firm belongs will determine its 
strategies for forming and maintaining alliances, and is thus “overly deterministic” 
(Contractor, Chang-Su Kim and Beldona, 2002). 
Resource Based View (RBV) - Motivations for alliance formation include RBV 
explanations of firms seeking to gain access to resources and knowledge to improve 
competencies (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Das and Teng, 2000).  However, 
the RBV does not inform us about alliance outcomes.  That is, the RBV cannot 
distinguish whether the resources themselves or the deployment of the resources 
contribute to the performance of an alliance.   
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Organizational Learning Theory – This theoretical perspective provides explanations 
for both the motivations to form alliances and the inter-partner learning that occurs in 
alliances (Hamel, 1991).  Firms use alliances to gain access to other firms' capabilities 
(Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996) and attempt to build their knowledge base 
from their partner's information (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997).   
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Theory – This perspective suggests that 
alliances are formed as an “efficient response to conditions where transactions cannot 
be easily conducted through market contracts” (Contractor, Chang-Su and Beldona, 
2002).  TCE can also be used to show that firms choose to opt out of alliances when 
the transaction costs of alliances increase to a certain threshold.  For example, some 
studies which have relied on TCE to explain alliance failures include Buckley and 
Casson (1996) and Parkhe (1993a). 
Other theoretical perspectives that have been used to explain alliance 
outcomes include agency theory (Geringer and Hebert, 1989), game theory (Parkhe, 
1993a; Gulati et al., 1994), strategic behavior theory (Kogut, 1988) and investment 
option theory (Kogut, 1991).    
After considering these theories, we have chosen to focus on the 
organizational learning theory to examine how learning from past alliance experiences 
impacts future alliance outcomes.  We also refer to the TCE to demonstrate the high 
transaction costs of managing increased simultaneous alliance commitments, and their 
consequences for alliance performance.   
 
e) The Organizational Learning Perspective 
Studies from several literature streams including the organizational learning 
perspective (e.g., Mukherjee, Lapre and Van Wassenhove, 2000), the organizational 
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behavior perspective (e.g., Levitt and March, 1988), and evolutionary economics 
(e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982) have argued that as a firm accumulates greater 
experience in performing a particular activity, its performance will improve.  The 
organizational learning perspective is highly relevant to the study of strategic 
alliances because alliances are complex activities, where repeated performance will 
enable the mastering of processes and establishment of appropriate routines (Doz, 
1996; Doz and Hamel, 1998).    
Learning can also be considered as a motive for alliance formation, which can 
explain the growth in the alliance formation trend, since firms can gain access to 
partners’ knowledge (Inkpen, 2002).  This organizational knowledge might provide 
firms with a competitive advantage, which is critical to the survival of the firm, and 
often results in increasing the longevity of alliances (Parkhe, 1991; Inkpen, 2000). 
However, research on experiential learning through alliances has yielded mixed 
results (Reuer, Park and Zollo, 2002).  
i) What facilitates learning in alliances? 
There are many factors that facilitate learning in strategic alliances.  Four of 
these are briefly discussed as follows: 
Strategic Objectives - Firms can learn from their alliance partner, depending on their 
strategic objectives.  That is, firms can acquire and ‘internalize’ knowledge from 
alliances and apply this knowledge to enhance strategy and operations in areas 
unrelated to the alliance activities, which may be for new geographic markets, 
products, and businesses (Inkpen, 2002).  However, the realization of the learning 
benefits depends on the partner firms recognizing opportunities within the alliance to 




Relational Capacity – Openness or transparency between collaborative partners is an 
essential element in the learning process, as it enables the flow of knowledge (Hamel, 
1991).  Therefore, in order to learn through an alliance, “a firm must have access to 
partner knowledge and must work closely with its partner” (Powell, Koput and Smith-
Doerr, 1996).  Research also suggests that community membership facilitates alliance 
learning, particularly in fields where rapid technological change occurs (Baum and 
Calabrese, 2000). 
Ownership Structure - Equity arrangements promote greater inter-firm knowledge 
transfers, particularly of technological capabilities, than do mere contractual ones 
because of the higher level of integration between the source and sourcing firms under 
an equity alliance (Kogut, 1988; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996).  However, 
even some bilateral contractual alliances may feature coordination and control 
mechanisms (similar to those of equity alliances) that support inter-organizational 
learning (Colombo, 2003). 
Absorptive Capacity - A firm’s ‘absorptive capacity’ for learning, its ability to 
recognize and assimilate valuable knowledge from an alliance partner, depends on the 
firm’s endowment of relevant technology-based capabilities (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).   
Despite the presence of these factors, some research suggests that learning  
does not occur in alliances (Olk, 2002).  One reason for this is that knowledge may be 
“deeply embedded and highly dependent on broader contextual factors such as 
knowledge resources, organizational structure, and culture” (Olk, 2002).  Another 
reason is the presence of partner firm heterogeneity in alliances.  This can result in 
firms applying the learning from past alliance experiences to new alliances, which 
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seem to be apparently similar but are fundamentally different (Reuer, Park and Zollo, 
2002).   
ii) How does learning impact alliance outcomes? 
Alliance outcomes can depend on the ability of partner firms to learn (Doz, 
1996).   
Positive learning outcomes - Learning can impact alliance outcomes in many 
different respects.  It can help partner firms design better alliances in general (Lyles, 
1988) and choose appropriate partners, in particular (Ahuja, 2000; Tsai and Ghoshal, 
1998; Simonin, 1997).  Past collaborative activities provide firms with the opportunity 
to learn to develop their own reputations, e.g., by gaining higher stock market 
valuations as a result of alliance announcements (Das, Sen and Sengupta, 1998; 
Anand and Khanna, 2000).  Past alliance experience also enabled firms to learn how 
to determine the technical and financial capabilities of other firms (Gulati, 1995).  
Learning can also help partner firms refine their relationship skills - specifically 
developing strategies and patterns for efficient and productive resource exchange with 
partners (Merchant and Schendel, 2000; Reuer, Zollo and Singh, 2002).   
Negative learning outcomes – Sometimes alliance participants do not make the most 
of the opportunity to learn from their alliances.  This can lead to negative transfer 
effects, such as firms making inappropriate decisions regarding their alliance 
strategies (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1998).  This in turn may result in such firms 
entering into alliances which will not survive due to, e.g., a lack of synergy. 
Furthermore, Hamel (1991) argued that asymmetric learning occurs in 
alliances, i.e., competitive learning that is associated with inter-partner bargaining 
power, such that the partner that learns the fastest then dominates the relationship.  
This tension between cooperation and competition between alliance partners can 
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impact the stability of the relationship due to the inequity in bargaining power 
(Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; Khanna, Gulati and Nohria, 1998).  Such instability will 
have negative consequences for alliance outcomes. 
iii) How does learning from past alliances impact future alliance extension? 
Drawing from the organizational learning literature, we have argued that firms 
internalize the learning from their prior alliances and transfer it to future alliances 
(Anand and Khanna 2000; Barkema et al, 1997).  This means that when a firm 
decides to forge a collaborative relationship with another firm, the learning it has 
accumulated through its past alliances can be applied to the new alliance.  This has 
implications for alliance outcomes, as the greater the learning accumulated by the 
firm prior to the formation of a new alliance, the more successful the new alliance will 
be.  Such positive outcomes suggest that the alliance will either be completed 
successfully or that the partner firms will choose to continue working on their 
collaborative project by extending or expanding the alliance, even if their original 
objectives have been achieved.  Therefore, we can further develop our theoretical 
arguments to include the impact of learning from past alliances on alliance extension.  
We argue that, at the point of formation of a focal alliance, the combined prior 
alliance experience of the partner firms implies a greater accumulation of learning by 
the partner firms, which can be applied to the focal alliance, leading to a positive 
alliance outcome.  
Furthermore, we need to examine what influences partners’ intentions to 
continue to collaborate on a particular venture, i.e., a positive alliance outcome.  In 
particular, we refer to learning momentum.  Miller and Friesen (1980) argue that any 
emerging organizational trend will tend to have momentum associated with it.  We 
argue that, once they begin to achieve alliance objectives through learning, partner 
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firms gain momentum in acquiring knowledge, which facilitates the achievement of 
alliance objectives.  As firms acquire alliance experience, they are more likely to be 
successful in achieving positive alliance outcomes because of the factors that facilitate 
alliance learning.  This in turn leads to a learning momentum, which calls for the 
continuity of the alliance relationship through alliance extension.  Therefore, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the prior alliance experience of the partner firms in 
a focal alliance, the greater the likelihood that the particular alliance will be 
extended. 
We justify our choice to infer alliance learning by looking at alliance 
outcomes, since Makino and Delios (1996) were able to infer from venture 
performance and local partner relationships that learning was occurring in their study.  
It has also been demonstrated that learning occurs when an opportunity is created 
(Powell, Kogut and Smith-Doerr, 1996).  Once the focal alliance is formed, alliance 
partners may be presented with more opportunities to form collaborative relationships 
with other firms.  However, if a firm forms too many simultaneous alliances, then this 
may affect its absorptive capacity such that it cannot benefit from the knowledge of its 
partners, and thus the focal alliance is not optimized.   
In the next section we argue that learning benefits still accrue but that the 
transaction costs outweigh the learning advantages, and thus we have diminishing 
marginal utility in terms of contribution to learning.  Therefore, too many 
simultaneous alliance commitments will have a negative impact on alliance outcomes.  





f) Transaction Costs Theory 
We argue that simultaneous alliances formed after the formation of the focal 
alliance might have different implications, specifically since it would proxy the 
simultaneous commitment of firm resources.  The transaction costs theory argues that 
under conditions of opportunism, bounded rationality, asset specificity, and small 
numbers in the market, market failure occurs, and firms find it more efficient to 
conduct transactions by forming strategic alliances (Hennart, 1998, 1991; Shan, 1990; 
Williamson, 1991).  However, we suggest that there is a point at which alliances 
themselves incur such high transaction costs, which outweigh the benefits of 
participating in alliances.  In such a scenario, these conditions are compounded and 
we see failure of some of these alliances. 
Therefore, we argue that high transaction costs will have a negative impact on 
alliance outcomes.  Transaction costs are the difficulties that are borne by firms when 
conducting exchanges (Jones and Hill, 1988) and include “the expenses incurred for 
writing and enforcing contracts, for haggling over terms and contingent claims, for 
deviating from optimal kinds of investments in order to increase dependence on party 
or stabilize a relationship, and for administering a transaction" (Kogut, 1988).  The 
conditions of bounded rationality, small numbers, asset specificity and opportunism 
can increase transaction costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1979, 1991). For example, 
Dyer (1997) found that bounded rationality influences partner firms’ decisions 
regarding the choice of governance structure of the alliance, and since a lack of trust 
is highly likely, partner firms will choose governance structures (e.g., by erecting 
walls), which are aimed at protecting themselves against the hazards of opportunism  
(Parkhe, 1993c).   
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Higher transaction costs due to numerous simultaneous alliance commitments 
could be due to three primary factors: i) increased complexity in organizational 
processes in managing the simultaneous relationships; ii) inability to invest sufficient 
resources in trust building for multiple alliances; and iii) increased vulnerability to 
opportunistic behavior in simultaneous relationships.  These three effects may be 
exaggerated ex post because of governance changes (e.g., contract alterations, board 
changes, or changes in monitoring mechanisms) that occur in these alliances - 
according to Reuer, Zollo and Singh’s (2002) study, as many as 40% of firms 
experienced them.   For instance, these changes might imply the need to expend 
greater efforts to manage the collaborative processes of the partner firms, in turn 
resulting in managerial complexity and uncertainty (Park and Ungson, 2001).  These 
three primary factors are inherent when firms are involved in simultaneous alliances 
and are discussed in more detail as follows: 
i) Increased complexity in managing the simultaneous relationships  
When firms are juggling too many simultaneous alliances, they face increased 
complexity in managing the simultaneous commitments.  Under conditions of 
uncertainty/complexity, such as high uncertainty over performance, firms are more 
constrained by bounded rationality, which is limited human ability to process 
information (Jones and Hill, 1988).  This means that managerial decision making is 
impeded, rendering the alliance vulnerable to negative outcomes. 
Furthermore, due to the asset specific nature of some alliances, increased 
simultaneous alliance activity may mean that asset transfer becomes more 
complicated.  For example, proprietary knowledge, an important type of specialized 
asset, becomes more difficult to transmit across organizational boundaries and 
information becomes more difficult to value (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). 
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ii) Inability to invest sufficient resources in trust building for multiple alliances 
Trust is vital for successful alliance outcomes because its presence implies 
commitment to the alliance (Madhok, 1995).  However, a high number of 
simultaneous alliances can increase the requirement of managerial resources, e.g., 
alliance coordination functions (Parise and Casher, 2003), which aid in building trust 
among partners.  The inability to invest in such resources would have negative 
consequences for alliance outcomes, since a lack of trust may cause alliance members 
to question the commitment of their alliance partners (Powell, Koput and Smith-
Doerr, 1996).  This issue is compounded further if one partner forms a simultaneous 
relationship with its partner’s competitor, as the level of trust between the focal firm 
and its partners is negatively impacted due to the threat of opportunism (Singh and 
Mitchell 1996). 
iii) Increased vulnerability to opportunistic behavior in simultaneous relationships 
We argue that the impact of transaction costs on alliance outcomes is probably 
most evident in the case of opportunism.  Participation in strategic alliances places 
partner firms at risk of becoming victims of opportunistic behavior.  The 
implementation of mechanisms which prevent or control such opportunism leads to 
increased transaction costs of maintaining the alliance relationship for partner firms.  
Das and Rahman (2002) argue that “different mechanisms need to be 
implemented under different circumstances to achieve maximum deterrence”, which 
may be why we see firms facing high transaction costs in alliances.  For example, 
some firms may not know about the appropriate deterrence mechanisms to implement 
and instead use the wrong ones.  We can consider two such deterrence mechanisms 
for opportunism, preventative and operational, which illustrate how alliances may 
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suffer from such high transaction costs that cause the alliances to be terminated 
instead of being extended: 
Preventative mechanisms – These are ex ante mechanisms, which are devised during 
the formation stage of an alliance to deter alliance partners from behaving 
opportunistically (Das and Rahman, 2002).  Under conditions of small numbers 
bargaining and/or asset specificity, there is an increased risk of opportunism (Hoyt 
and Huq, 2000).  Therefore, firms resort to making use of binding agreements or 
contracts and/or resource commitments in order to reduce their exposure to this risk 
(Williamson, 1979). 
The effectiveness of preventative mechanisms depends on the efficiency in 
their usage.  However, this also comes at a high price, since excessive screening or 
too many clauses in a contract would undermine the possible benefits of the alliance.  
Das and Rahman (2002) argue that “as the marginal cost of preventative mechanisms 
would exceed the marginal benefit of preventing opportunism, the member firms may 
not deem the alliance profitable”.  Therefore, firms may decide not to continue 
working together on their collaborative venture since they would realize the full 
extent of the requirements and costs of the preventative mechanisms needed only after 
entering into the alliance. 
Operational mechanisms – These are ex post mechanisms, which are implemented 
with the purpose of deterring opportunistic behavior once the alliance has been 
formed.  Two examples of operational mechanisms are monitoring and shared 
decision making.  One problem with implementing operational mechanisms is that 
they require a high level of managerial resources, which can lead to a lack of attention 
given towards strategic and performance-related issues of the alliance (Das and 
Rahman, 2002).  Another problem with operational mechanisms is that they impede 
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the development of trust in the alliance, as is evident in the possible adverse effects of 
monitoring (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996).   
 Table 1 summarizes the causes of increased transaction costs due to a high 
number of simultaneous alliance commitments.  We see that under conditions within 
alliances of uncertainty, complexity, lack of trust, and small numbers bargaining, 
firms are constrained by bounded rationality and opportunism.  This leads to negative 
alliance outcomes due to the high transaction costs of managing such alliances.    
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Since the mechanisms used to prevent opportunistic behavior lead to high 
transaction costs, the alliance is no longer an efficient means of exchange.  Thus, we 
argue that the greater the number of simultaneous commitments, the greater the 
transaction costs and the lower the likelihood of extension of the focal alliance.  
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the number of simultaneous alliance commitments 
of the partner firms after the formation of a focal alliance, the lower the 
likelihood of extension of that alliance. 
 Large number of simultaneous commitments might be one explanation of 
why many alliances are not extended.  
 
g) Interaction Between Prior Alliance Experience and Simultaneous Alliance 
Commitments 
Although we have argued that there is a point at which the number of 
simultaneous commitments between partner firms has negative consequences for 
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alliances, the interaction between prior alliance experience and simultaneous alliance 
commitments can have a positive impact on the likelihood of an alliance being 
extended.  Hence, we argue that there might be an interactive effect. 
Both organizational learning and transaction costs perspectives emphasize the 
importance of trust.  From the organizational learning perspective, trust is a key 
determinant of knowledge accessibility, since it facilitates the free exchange of 
information between partners without worrying about protecting themselves from 
others’ opportunistic behavior (Inkpen, 2002; Dodgson, 1993).  Trust between 
alliance partners can also lead to lower transaction costs since the risk of knowledge 
spillover reduces the need for costly contracts (Gulati, 1998).  Thus, we argue that the 
positive learning gained from prior alliances can overcome the negative effects of 
simultaneous commitments, resulting in positive alliance outcomes.  Therefore, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the combined amount of prior alliance experience 
and simultaneous commitments, the lower the likelihood of extension of the 
focal alliance. 
In summary, we employ the organizational learning perspective to examine 
the effects of collaborative experience gained prior to the formation of a focal alliance 
on the likelihood of its extension.  We predict that higher levels of prior experience 
will increase the likelihood of successful subsequent alliance formations and thus, 
alliance extensions.  On the other hand, we refer to the transaction costs theory to 
examine the effects of general collaborative experience gained after the formation of 
the focal alliance on the likelihood of its extension, i.e., simultaneous commitments.  
We predict that simultaneous commitments will lead to increased complexity and a 
lack of trust, which will reduce the likelihood of alliance extension.  In addition, we 
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predict that the interaction effect between the two forms of alliance experience will be 
positive.   
 
3. METHODS 
Our analysis includes both extended alliances and non-extended alliances, in 
order to provide a definite contrast between alliances, where firms are willing to work 
together and those where firms are not willing to work together on a current alliance.  
In doing so, we contrast the continuation of a relationship with the non-continuation 
of a relationship.     
 
a) Context 
We chose the global biopharma industry, which encompasses both the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, as the empirical setting.  In these 
industries, R&D is important for rapid and continuous innovation.  A majority of 
alliances in the biopharma industry are R&D alliances (Contractor, Kim and Beldona, 
2002).  Other types of alliances are also common in the biopharma industry.  For 
example, access to markets is important, and so they participate in licensing 
agreements for marketing and distribution alliances.   
 
b) Data 
The primary source for information regarding alliance formation and 
extension events in the biotechnology industry was BIOAbility, a company which 
specializes in information services for the biotechnology industry.  We used 
BIOAbility’s Actions Database, which contains information derived from articles 
published in 57 international publication sources, including biotechnology industry 
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journals and business sources, such as the Wall Street Journal.  The database includes 
several thousand events, in the form of announcements regarding alliance formation, 
extension, modification, and termination, mergers, facilities openings, patent filings, 
and regulatory approvals for new drugs, which have involved firms from 65 different 
countries.  Covering the period from 1980 to 1999, the database provides the 
following information on each alliance listed: announcement date, identity of the 
partners and their nationalities, technology and products involved, industry 
classification, a description of the particular transaction and assignment of partner 
firms into broad categories describing company type, such as biotech firms, 
diversified firms, etc.  The description of the alliance transaction provides details on 
the objectives of the alliance, as well as the roles performed by each of the alliance 
partners.  
In order to increase the sample size (explained later), we also used the 
Securities Data Company (SDC) database, which provides archival data on activities, 
types and industries of alliances.  The database is constructed from the following 
sources: SEC files, trade publications and news and wire services.  The Compustat 
and Bureau van Dijk databases, provided by Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS), were used to complement the alliance information by obtaining information 
on the firms involved in the alliances.  From these databases, we were able to retrieve 
firm specific-information, such as the firms’ SIC codes, as well as net income and 
number of employees figures.  
 
i) Case-Control Sample Selection Procedure  
If there is a lack of variation in outcomes, the effect of independent variables 
may not be visible.  Given our focus on discrete outcomes in the form of alliance 
  
33 
extensions, Cox Regression or Hazard Rate methodologies might seem appropriate.  
However, these methodologies would impose prohibitively high resource and 
information requirements, making it difficult to adopt them in the context of our 
present study, as explained below.  We believe that the case-control methodology, 
which involves contrasting a sample of cases (e.g., alliances that have been extended), 
with a sample of controls, (e.g., alliances that have not been extended) provides an 
attractive alternative methodology.  This methodology moves from effect to cause, 
whereas other methods, such as those that employ a cohort design, work from the 
cause to effect.  Researchers have adopted the case-control methodology to study 
phenomena such as hospital closures (Wertheim and Lynn, 1993), corporate failures 
(Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1988) and the termination of auditor-client relationships 
(Seabright, Levinthal and Fichman, 1992).  In the strategic management literature, 
Jensen (2003) studied the role of interfirm ties and network status in the entry of 
commercial banks into investment banking.   
This methodology can be applied to our study since alliances are a commonly 
used business strategy in the biotechnology industry, with the number of occurrences 
of such events running into the thousands.  However, alliance extensions occur less 
frequently relative to the number of alliance formations and information about 
alliance outcomes is not reported consistently.  For relatively less frequently occurring 
events, traditional methodologies fail because the large number of cases of common 
occurrences will inundate the relatively less frequent events.  Therefore, we want to 
conduct our study by reducing information requirements, allowing us to focus on a 
narrower sample of alliances, consisting of the cases and controls, rather than on the 
whole population, as in survival analysis/Cox Regression.   
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As a first step in the analysis, we identified all the alliance extensions in the 
BIOAbility Actions database.  We coded an alliance as an extended alliance if it was 
extended past its predetermined duration date due to either partial achievement of a 
mutually fruitful outcome, such as the discovery of a new drug, whereby the partner 
firms want to continue to collaborate in their current working context, or the 
requirement of extra time to complete a collaborative project, such as an R&D 
project.  This alliance became a ‘case’ alliance.  Also, we excluded multi-partner 
alliances, since it is difficult to arrive at partner-specific experience for such alliances 
(Saxton, 1997).  Although it may seem limiting to our study, a recent study by 
Robertson and Gatignon (1998) notes that 79% of technology alliances in fact have 
only two partners. 
In order to select the ‘control’ alliances for our study, we followed Seabright, 
Levinthal and Fichman (1992) and used the following procedure.  We stratified the 
‘controls’ according to the alliance partners involved and the year of formation.  We 
then picked individual ‘controls’ to match the ‘cases’ with respect to the following 
criteria: 1) One alliance partner was common to both the case and its corresponding 
control; 2) The control was formed in the same year as the case; and 3) The partner 
combination (e.g., a large pharmaceutical firm and a biotech firm) was similar across 
the case and the control.  We used the same year of formation to account for the 
possibility that the outcomes achieved by alliances formed during any particular year 
might be impacted by changes in legislation or other broader environmental 
conditions outside the control of the partners.  In some cases, both partners did not 
have either continuing or terminated alliances (potential controls) which had been 
established in the same year as the ‘case’ or extended alliance (Pangarkar, 2005).  In 
order to remedy this, we selected an appropriate continuing or terminated alliance that 
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was established within a band of one year on either side of the year of formation.  
Despite beginning with an originally large sample of alliances, which was drawn from 
longitudinal data covering the period from 1984 to 1997, our sample selection 
procedure significantly reduced our final sample of ‘cases’ and ‘controls’, which 
consisted of 63 ‘cases’ and 63 matched ‘controls’.  For the purpose of further analysis, 
the ‘cases’ and the ‘controls’ were combined together to form a sample of 126 
alliances. 
As is evident, the number of possible ‘cases’ in our sample is limited, and the 
case-control sampling procedure requires that there be an equal number of ‘controls’.  
However, in order to apply correction methods for selecting on the dependent 
variable, King and Zeng (2001) recommend that such a sample should consist of at 
least two, but not more than five times as many zeros as ones, because the marginal 
informational contribution of adding zeros starts to decrease as the number of zeros 
becomes greater than the number of ones. 
Therefore, we needed to extend our data sample by increasing the number of 
‘controls’—or alliances that were not expanded/ extended.  In order to ensure that the 
selected alliances were not-extended due to either completion or termination, we 
chose to search for terminated alliances, since ‘completed’ alliances, could possibly 
imply alliances that had been completed due to the achievement of initial objectives.  
Using the SDC database we began with a very large population of alliances.  
However, this number was significantly diminished due to our sample selection 
procedure.  For example, we restricted our selection to certain countries, so our 
geographic scope covered the areas of north America; United Kingdom; Western 
Europe; Australasia;  Japan, North Korea and Taiwan; and Singapore.  The reason for 
this is that these countries generally cover developed or transition economies.  We 
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also restricted our selection to certain industrial classifications, such that the primary 
SIC codes chosen for the partner firms of the alliances were 2836, 2835, 2833 and 
2834, which covered the biopharma industry in general.  Therefore, our sample 
selection procedure reduced our final sample as is shown below: 
• Number of alliance formations announced between 1980 and 2008 – 118,060 
• Number of alliances (from this group) completed between these dates – 84,465 
• Number of alliances (from this group) in list of chosen countries – 56,622 
• Number of alliances (from this group) with SIC primary code 
2836/2835/2833/2834 – 5084 
These 5084 alliances thus identified acted as the population representing the 
alliances relevant to our study.  From this population of alliances, we identified 59 
alliances, which had been terminated by referring to the alliance synopsis information.  
This ensured that we had a sample of non-extended alliances, which were not only 
completed but also terminated. 
In order to deal with endogeneity, we have a large sample of 200 firms that 
have participated in the 185 alliances in our sample.  This means that only a small 
proportion of our sample is involved in multiple alliances.  Furthermore, if the source 
of the endogeneity problem is the fact that there are several large pharmaceutical 
firms which are involved in multiple alliances, then we have controlled for firm size 
to deal with this.  Also, in our sampling technique, we ensured that each selected 
alliance was formed to achieve a new objective and each alliance was extended for the 
same initial objective (which could be expanded).  We also checked the synopsis 
information for detailed information on the cause of termination, either fulfillment of 
objectives or termination due to negative alliance outcomes. 
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Overall, we ended up with 126 alliances (63 ‘cases’ and 63 ‘controls’) from 
the original sample and then added another 59 which were non-extended alliances, 
giving us a total of 185 alliances, drawn from longitudinal data covering the period 
from 1984 to 2004. 
 
c) Measures 
i) Dependent Variable:   
Our dependent variable, Alliance Extension, measures the likelihood that a 
firm’s current or subsequent alliances will be extended.  Alliance Extension was 
coded as binary variable, with 1 indicating that the alliance was extended and 0 
indicating otherwise.   
ii) Independent Variables: 
Prior Alliance Experience.  We operationalized this variable by calculating the 
average of the number of the prior alliance experiences of the two partners.  This 
approach, which is similar to that used by Anand and Khanna (2000) and Oxley 
(1999), implicitly assumes that the amount of experience between the partnering firms 
in an alliance is balanced out because the more experienced partner helps the less 
experienced partner, rather than exploiting the difference in experience (Khanna, 
Gulati and Nohria 1998).  Our assumption is justified by the finding that joint or 
collective experience is a predictor of value creation rather than value division (Anand 
and Khanna, 2000).  For each partner firm, the prior alliance experience was 
calculated by taking the number of alliances formed prior to the formation of the focal 
alliance, and dividing this by the total number of alliances formed by the firm within 
our sampling window.  We chose to calculate prior alliance experience as a proportion 
of total number of alliance formed instead of just the number of alliances formed prior 
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to the focal alliance formation date because, both prior to alliance formation and after 
alliance extension/non-extension, the time frame of our sampling window is very 
large.  Conversely, alliance duration is relatively short.  Therefore, we are likely to see 
relatively less alliances being formed in the period spanning the duration of the 
alliance.  
Simultaneous Commitments.  This variable is a count of the average number of 
alliances formed by the two partners between the date of formation and the date of 
extension of the focal alliance.  It is important to note that for the ‘control’ alliances 
that were not extended, we used the average number of alliances formed by the two 
partners between the date of formation and the sampling window boundary of 2004. 
iii) Control Variables: 
Partner-specific Alliance Experience.  Prior affiliation has been demonstrated to 
affect both the development of trust between partner firms and the acquisition of 
partner-specific expertise, which are critical to the nature, and thus success, of future 
cooperative relationships between the same partnering firms (Levinthal and Fichman, 
1988).  Prior experience with a specific partner also influences expectations of the 
partner’s future behavior, and thus the quality of the alliance (Arino and de le Torre, 
1998).  This variable was operationalized as the total number of relationships between 
the pair of firms from before formation of the focal alliance (the starting year of the 
database, 1980) up until the extension date (in the case of ‘controls’ the extension date 
was used as the end date). 
Duration of Alliance.  It has been argued that alliances of longer duration allow each 
partner firm to create a dedicated alliance function, which can create value for the 
firms by capturing and codifying knowledge more effectively, and thus increase the 
likelihood of alliance extension (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002).  This variable refers to 
  
39 
the length of an alliance, and was operationalized by calculating the duration of an 
alliance in months from start date to termination/completion or extension date. 
Cultural Distance.  Since several prior studies have argued that national-level 
cultural differences can imply greater challenges in international alliances (Kogut and 
Singh, 1988), we expect that they will reduce the likelihood of alliance extension.  
That is, firms with different cultural values may experience culture clashes after 
alliance formation (Sirmon and Lane, 2004).  In order to calculate cultural distance, 
we used Hofstede’s (1980) indices and Kogut and Singh’s (1988) formula.  We 
operationalized this variable as a continuous variable. 
Purpose/ scope of the alliance: Joint R&D.  Joint R&D alliances might exhibit 
greater stickiness (Osborn and Baughn, 1990) and once partner firms have developed 
the requisite trust and routines for effective cooperation, they may prefer to extend a 
current collaborative arrangement, rather than forming a new one.  We 
operationalized the Joint R&D variable as a binary variable, with 1 indicating a joint 
R&D alliance and 0 indicating otherwise. 
Governance structure: Equity versus non-equity alliances.  Since equity alliances 
have high entry and exit costs, once firms have established a relationship, they will 
exhibit a stickiness, similar to joint R&D alliances.’  Therefore, we expect that equity 
alliances are more likely to be extended.  We operationalized the Equity variable as a 
binary variable, with 1 indicating an equity alliance and 0 indicating otherwise. 
Industry of partner firms: SIC similarity.  Alliances formed between similar 
partners are more likely to result in the development of synergies, which can result in 
a successful collaborative relationship.  Partner firms operating in the same domain 
(e.g., industry) face similar issues and thus share overlapping dominant logics 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1995).  Therefore, alliances between such competitors are likely 
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to result in inter-partner learning (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998), and thus an increased 
likelihood of alliance extension.   
We computed this variable by comparing the first unit of each of the two SIC 
codes for the pair of partner firms, assigning a 1 if they were the same and a 0 if they 
were different.  Secondly, we compared the second unit of each pair of SIC codes and 
assigned a 1 if they were the same and a 0 if they were different.  This was repeated 
for the third and fourth digits for each pair of SIC codes.  Note that for any unit 
comparison, if a 0 was assigned, then all subsequent units for the pair of SIC codes 
were assigned with a 0.  Finally, we added the 1’s and 0’s to compute an SIC code 
comparison score; 4 indicating that all four digits of the pair of SIC codes being 
compared were the same and 0 indicating that the pair of SIC codes are completely 
different. 
Year of Alliance Formation.  This variable indicates the year in which the alliance 
was formed.  This variable was operationalized by creating a set three of dummy 
variables, the first representing the years 1984 to 1990, the second 1991 to 1996, and 
the third 1997 to 2004.  The third group only represented a range of six years, which 
covered a range of eight years each, since it contained two years in which there were 
no alliance formations, i.e., 2001 and 2002.  We operationalized each dummy variable 
with 1 indicating that the alliance had been formed in that particular range of years 
and 0 when it had not.  In order to prevent perfect multicollinearity, which would not 
allow any regression estimation, we had to drop one of these dummy variables for the 
regression analyses. 
Number of Employees.  The number of employees in a firm reflects its size, and thus 
its market power, economies of scale, process innovation and organizational image 
(Geringer, 1991).  Since larger firms may have more resources to invest in their 
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alliance activities, they are more likely to experience successful alliance outcomes 
(Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002).  Thus, we included this firm-specific control variable 
for firm size.  It was operationalized as the average of the number of employees in 
each of the partner firms, in thousands. 
Profitability.  Profitable firms have greater resources available to them to invest in 
alliance coordination and control functions, which might facilitate successful alliance 
outcomes (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002).    It was operationalized as the average of the 
net income (in millions of US dollars) for each of the two partner firms in each 
alliance.   
 Table 2 presents a list of the variables included in this study and their 
operationalizations. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
d) Statistical Analysis 
In order to test our hypothesized relationships and provide unbiased estimates 
of all the parameters, we used rare-events logit regression analysis, known as relogit, 
which was developed by King and Zeng (2001).  They argue that, if the sample is 
generated using a case-control design, it is important to correct for selecting on the 
dependent variable.  This is because, while the slope coefficients are approximately 
unbiased, the constant term may be significantly biased.  Also, the relogit procedure 
estimates the same model as standard logistic regression, but the estimates are 





.  A recent study in the strategic management literature, which examines non-
cooperating dyads and cooperating dyads, also uses the same methodology by 
employing the case-control sampling procedure, along with prior correction and the 
relogit method of statistical analysis (Trapido, 2007). 
 
4. RESULTS 
Most of the alliances in our sample were formed during the late 80's and early 
90's, with the earliest alliances being formed in 1984 and the most recent alliances 
being formed in 2004.  The greatest number of alliances in our sample were formed in 
1991, which saw 25 alliances (13.5% of the total) being formed.  With regards to 
alliance extension, 1996 was by far the year in which most of the alliances (16, 8.6% 
of the total) in our sample of 'cases' were extended.  The mean for the Prior Alliance 
Experience variable was 0.26 with the minimum for this variable being 0 and the 
maximum being 0.86.  The mean for the Simultaneous Commitments variable was 
25.63, with the minimum for this variable being 0 and the maximum being 96.  In 
terms of the duration of the alliances, the minimum duration was one month, while the 
maximum duration was 129 months.  More interestingly, the most common duration 
of an alliance was 22 months, while the average duration was approximately 33 
months.  This indicates that in general, alliances in our sample lasted for around 2 to 3 
years. 
In our sample, firms from the United States (US) were the most active in 
forming alliances.  As many as 175 alliances (94.6% of the total) in our sample 
involved US-based firms.  Similarly, US-based firms were involved in the most same-
country alliances (90, 48.6% of the total).  Among international collaborations, US-
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UK alliances were the most common (17 alliances, 9.2% of the total).  Therefore, the 
lowest cultural distance score of the firms involved in some of these alliances was 
0.00, due to 93 same-country alliances of which 90 were between US firms.  
However, the highest cultural distance score was 2.79 for an alliance between a 
Japanese and a UK firm. 
In terms of company type, 130 alliances (70.3% of the total) were formed 
between firms of different types, ie., between biotechnology and diversified firms.  54 
alliances (29.2% of the total) were formed between a pair of biotechnology firms, 
while only one alliance was formed between a pair of diversified firms.  Similarly, we 
find that most alliances were formed between firms with different SIC codes: all four 
digits of the SIC were different for 59 (31.9% of the total) and 131 alliances (70.8% 
of the total) were formed between firms with 2 or more SIC digits differing.  Only 5 
alliances (2.7% of the total) were formed between firms with only the final SIC digit 
differing.  We also found that 108 alliances (58.4% of the total) were joint R&D 
alliances and 72 (38.9% of the total) were equity alliances.  This suggests that firms in 
our sample preferred to collaborate with substantially different firms with the 
intention of learning from them through R&D ventures.  
Table 3 includes the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation matrix.  It is 
apparent that there were no cases of multicollinearity.  However, as an extra check of 
the reliability of our measures, we estimated the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for 
the variables in order to assess the threat of multicollinearity.  We found that none of 
the VIFs was greater than 2 (not reported), significantly below ten, which indicates 
multicollinearity problems (Neter, Wasserman and Kutner, 1996). 
------------------------------- 




Table 4 shows the results of the relogit regression analysis.  We conducted the 
analysis by estimating a series of stepped or nested models.  We began with a model 
containing only the control variables (Model 1), which served as our baseline model 
and  then evaluated our three hypotheses in Models 2 and 3, followed by Models 4 
and 5, which contain the full specification and the interaction, respectively. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
In Model 1, we find that neither the duration of an alliance nor the year of 
formation has any impact on the likelihood of alliance extension.  Also, we find that 
alliances formed for the purpose of joint R&D and those formed as equity alliances 
are also no more likely to be extended than other alliances.  For the evaluation of 
individual hypotheses, we begin with Model 2 since this model contains the key 
variables of interest.   
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the prior alliance experience of the partnering 
firms prior to the formation of a particular alliance has a positive impact on the 
likelihood of that alliance being extended.  We see in Model 2 that the coefficient for 
prior alliance experience is positive and significant (p < 0.10).  Therefore, Hypothesis 
1 is supported.   
Hypothesis 2 predicted that higher simultaneous alliance commitments of the 
partnering firms after the formation of a particular alliance have a negative impact on 
the likelihood of that alliance being extended.  In Model 3, the variable has indeed a 
negative and significant coefficient (p < 0.05), thus providing support for Hypothesis 
2.  Model 4, which provides a full specification model, affirms our earlier results from 
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Models 2 and 3, with positive significant (p < 0.10) and negative significant (p < 
0.05) results for prior alliance experience and simultaneous commitments, 
respectively.  This shows that our results are stable.  Finally, Model 5, which tests for 
an interaction effect between prior alliance experience and simultaneous 
commitments, indicates that the coefficient for the interaction term is positive and 
significant (p < 0.010). 
 We note that Table 4 does not indicate the values of the R-squared and Chi-
squared statistics since these were not provided by the relogit regression output.  
However, we also conducted a logit regression analysis on our sample and found the 
results for all models to be robust (not reported).  In fact, we found that the R-squared 
statistic, representing the amount of variance explained by the model, increased from 
0.03 for Model 1 to 0.12 for Model 5.  Also, the Chi-squared statistic increased from 
7.26 for Model 1 to 27.45 for Model 5.  Additionally, the log likelihood statistic 
improved from -115.03 for Model 1 to -104.93 for Model 5, indicating a better fitting 
model.  These results are shown in Table 5. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
Our results can be summarized in the matrix presented in Figure 2.  This matrix 
indicates that high levels of prior experience will lead to positive alliance outcomes in 
terms of alliance extension.  On the other hand, high levels of simultaneous alliance 
commitments lead to a high likelihood of alliance extension only in conjunction with 
high levels of prior alliance experience.  In fact, when prior alliance experience is 









In this paper we distinguished between prior alliance experience and 
simultaneous alliance commitments of partner firms.  We argued that the impact of 
these factors on the likelihood of alliance extension can be usefully examined by 
adopting two different theoretical lenses: the organizational learning perspective and 
the transactions costs perspective.  Using the organizational learning perspective, we 
argued that alliance experience gained prior to the formation of a focal alliance is 
beneficial since it helps in the accumulation of expertise about partner selection and 
alliance structuring, among other factors (Doz, 1996; Doz and Hamel, 1998).  We also 
argued that post-formation alliances by partner firms, in the form of simultaneous 
commitments, are likely to raise the transaction costs due to the simultaneous nature 
of these alliances (Parkhe, 1993c) and hence, negatively impact the likelihood of 
alliance extension.  In addition, we hypothesized that the interaction effect of the prior 
alliance experience and simultaneous commitments would be positive, arguing that 
when firms have both prior alliance experience and are involved in other simultaneous 
alliance commitments, this leads to positive alliance outcomes, i.e., alliance extension.   
We found support for all three hypotheses.  That is, alliance extension is 
highly likely if firms posses prior alliance experience.  However, we also find that too 
many simultaneous alliance commitments can lead to negative alliance outcomes, i.e., 
non-extension.  We suggest that the positive effects of learning from prior alliances 
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are neutralized if a firm has too many simultaneous commitments.  That is, as the 
number of simultaneous alliance commitments increases, there may be a diminishing 
marginal utility in terms of the contribution towards learning.  Therefore, transaction 
costs of alliances are manageable up to the point that there are not too many 
simultaneous commitments.  
So when can firms manage simultaneous commitments?  Our results suggest 
that if firms are looking to achieve positive alliance outcomes, they should maintain a 
balance between prior alliance experience and the number of current simultaneous 
alliance commitments.  Over time as each successful alliance is either completed or 
extended, then the number of prior alliance experiences increases, so the 
recommended number of alliances to be formed or participated in simultaneously 
increases.  Therefore, more experienced firms may have the ability to manage a 
greater number of simultaneous alliance commitments. 
We recommend that firms manage simultaneous alliance commitments in the 
manner proposed by Parise and Casher (2003).  They suggest that firms adopt the 
alliance portfolio approach for managing their alliances.  This effort includes 
implementing alliance functions dedicated to allocating resources to specific alliances.  
 
b) Limitations 
We acknowledge several limitations of our analysis.  Our measures for 
alliance experience are only a proxy for the extent of organizational learning, which 
we argue facilitates alliance extension.  That is, although forming alliances may 
provide partner firms with the opportunity to learn, several factors will influence 
whether or not this learning will actually occur.  Nonetheless, our approach is 
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consistent with several prior studies (e.g., Hamel, 1991; Mowery, Oxley and 
Silverman, 1996; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Dussauge, Garrette and Mitchell, 2000).   
Furthermore, our study assumes that alliance experience will have positive 
influences.  However, we must acknowledge that certain alliance outcomes can have 
negative impacts on partner firms, such as acquiring a negative reputation or loss of 
trust after an alliance termination. 
The main limitation of our study is that we have used a secondary source of 
data to observe events, such as alliance extension.  Although this has been the 
approach adopted by several researchers in the past (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Dussauge, 
Garrette and Mitchell, 2000), perhaps a better alternative approach would be to use a 
primary data source.  For example, we could conduct detailed case studies of alliances 
in order to observe the nature of organizational learning directly (e.g., Arino and de la 
Torre, 1998).   
 
c) Further research 
This study suggests several areas for further research.  Our main finding that 
that the alliance experience of the partnering firms after the formation of a particular 
alliance has a negative impact on the likelihood of that alliance being extended 
requires further empirical validation in a diverse range of industries.  Future research 
might also perform a fine grained analysis of the reasons of alliance extension and the 
drivers of these outcomes.  Another fruitful avenue might include examining whether 
prior alliance extensions increase the likelihood of future alliance extensions.  We 
submit that extensions represent an opportunity for partner firms to introspect and 
accumulate knowledge which might help future alliance performance.  In order to 
more thoroughly demonstrate the presence of learning through alliances, future 
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research could be conducted on this topic by examining patent citations resulting from 
alliances.  Another option is to carry out a similar study but from the perspective of 
the firm, to see whether each alliance partner’s future alliances are extended or not.  
Such a study could be conducted by measuring prior alliance experience and the 
number of simultaneous commitments at the firm level and examining the impact of 
these on each firm’s alliance outcomes.   
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This study aimed to contribute to the literature by examining the impact of 
past alliance experience on the likelihood of the continuation of current, simultaneous 
co-operative relationships.  Our approach to this study has featured a number of 
different novel elements including: using alliance extension as an outcome measure; 
differentiating between alliance experience gained prior to and after focal alliance 
formation; proposing that transaction costs matter not just in terms of choosing ex-
ante governance structure but also in post-formation achievement of outcomes; and, 
lastly, the adoption of the case control methodology.   
Our results suggest that firms can manage simultaneous alliance commitments 
better when they maintain a balance between prior experience, and current 
simultaneous alliance commitments.  The consequences of this are that firstly, the 
learning gained prior to the formation of a focal alliance is useful and can be applied 
to the current alliances that the firms are involved in.  Secondly, the transaction costs 
of participating in a focal alliance are manageable and allow firms to overcome 
increased complexity in organizational processes in managing the simultaneous 
relationships, the inability to invest sufficient resources in trust building for multiple 
alliances and the increased vulnerability to opportunistic behavior in simultaneous 
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relationships.   In conclusion, our study contributes to the literature by allowing us to 
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